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Hacking the Anti-Hacking Statute: 
Using the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to 
Secure Public Data Exclusivity 
 
By Nicholas A. Wolfe* 
ABSTRACT 
 In August, 2015, hackers exposed approximately 33 million user records associated 
with the extra-marital affair website Ashley Madison. The hackers made this data available 
to the public through torrents and other file sharing protocols. This data became instantly 
irresistible to the media and suspicious spouses everywhere. However, is accessing the 
user records illegal under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act? While many legal scholars 
agree that accessing or publishing this data is not likely a violation of the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, the United States Attorney’s office does not necessarily see it that way.  
 “Once you download or distribute hacked information without specific permission 
or a fair use license, you've exposed yourself to potential criminal liability under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,” says a representative of the Chicago U.S. Attorney’s 
office. “An individual who retweets or forwards a link to a website containing hacked 
information could potentially be viewed as an accessory to the hack after the fact.” 
 A “hack after the fact” not only leads to criminal penalties but a civil cause of action 
under the Act, which is quickly becoming a leading statute in U.S. cybersecurity law.  
 This Article describes problems inherent in the Act when compared with modern 
web-based applications and how savvy civil litigators are “hacking” the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act for their own purposes, namely as a para-copyright tool. This “hack” is 
accomplished by exposing two vulnerabilities: (1) the literal application of the term 
“access controls” encompassing token controls; and (2) the mere facial review of loss 
declarations. For example, by taking advantage of these two vulnerabilities, attorneys for 
Craigslist were able to secure exclusivity to the publicly-available advertisements on its 
website.  
 This Article’s solution to the vulnerabilities is to build in reference to data security 
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INTRODUCTION 
¶1  Work smarter, not harder. Perhaps no other saying better captures the era of hyper-
productivity and automation in which we live. Titles such as ‘Top Ten Hacks to Avoid 
Paywalls,’ ‘Five Ways You’re Wasting Your Time,’ and ‘One Weird Trick’ fly across our 
computer screens on a commoditized basis.1 Tips and tricks that automate our lives and 
help us get more done, faster – better living through automation. However, as these shortcut 
solutions (colloquially referred to as “hacks”) get better and automation advances, the 
question arises: When does working smarter cross the line into cheating? Or put differently, 
when do “hacks” rise to the level of computer hacking? 
¶2  The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) was drafted to draw the line between 
“hacks” and hacking. Drafted in 1986 and amended with a frequency similar to iOS 
updates, there are nine ways to violate the CFAA.2 This article covers just one. Subsection 
1030(a)(2)(C) provides that anyone who (1) intentionally accesses without or in excess of 
authorization (2) information (3) that causes a plaintiff at least $5,000 loss in a 1-year 
period is engaged in hacking under the CFAA.3 Access without or in excess of 
authorization is generally interpreted with reference to circumvention of some access 
control. Concerning the $5,000 loss requirement, the plaintiff is generally required to 
submit a supporting declaration.4  
¶3  At its core, the CFAA is intended to deter the exploitation of computer system 
vulnerabilities that cause damage to the computer system. Ironically, in so doing, the 
CFAA has exposed two of its own vulnerabilities in the face of a dynamic technological 
landscape:  
(1) Literal application of “access control” to encompass any access control, 
including mere token controls;5 
(2) Cursory review of loss declarations to include any first party expense, 
whether incurred reasonably or unreasonably.6 
¶4  The consequences of these vulnerabilities are widespread. For example, if you are 
reading this article in a Chrome browser and were to open a new tab and navigate to the 
Seattle Times website, read your maximum article limit, and then press Ctrl + U to view 
the source code and read one additional article in HTML form, the 3Taps court would likely 
interpret your actions as hacking under the CFAA.7  
¶5  These two vulnerabilities enable unchecked application of a powerful criminal 
statute as “as a tactical tool to gain business or litigation advantage,” particularly as a para-
copyright tool to secure exclusivity to otherwise publicly accessible data.8  
 
1 See, e.g., Thorin Klosowski, Bypass Paywalls and Other Blocks with a Few Google Proxy Servers, 
LIFEHACKER (Jul. 16, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://lifehacker.com/use-google-as-a-proxy-server-to-bypass-
paywalls-and-oth-799030304.  
2 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2013). 
3 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).  
4 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i).  
5 See generally Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
6 See generally, Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 969, n.8. 
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¶6  This article proposes a cure for these two vulnerabilities by first restricting 
application of Subsection 1030(a)(c)(2) to “protected data” only. The First, Fourth, and 
Ninth circuits follow this approach already.9 The Seventh, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits 
disagree.10 Second, to add clarity to the meaning of protected data, this article aims to 
distinguish between protected and unprotected data with reference to access controls and 
to exclude mere token access controls, achieved by defining in the context of good 
cybersecurity practices. Notably, an access control that by default admits all traffic should 
be scrutinized more thoroughly than an access control that by default denies all traffic 
because of the potential for selective and tactical wielding of the CFAA as a sword against 
competitors. Third, this article proposes the elimination of cursory review of loss 
declarations by applying a three-factor test to better limit plaintiff abuse. Currently, a 
plaintiff need only hire an expensive forensic IT consultant to meet its requirement under 
the statute, whether any actual harm in fact occurred or was likely to occur.  
I. THE 3TAPS DECISION 
¶7  The 3Taps decision most clearly captures the two CFAA vulnerabilities discussed in 
this article. Reading the decision, one may be reminded of that proverbial frog in a pot of 
water, slowly reaching the boiling point. The judicial analysis seems logical degree by 
degree, but the ultimate decision is hard to swallow. 3Taps, Inc. operates an apartment-
listing website that displays available listings geographically.11 One of 3Taps’ largest 
sources of data for apartment listings was Craigslist.12 Craigslist is an online classified 
advertisement web site on which users post a variety of classified advertisements, including 
apartment listings.13 3Taps developed a web scraping software to pull listings from 
Craigslist in real time.14 Upon realizing how 3Taps was accessing its website, Craigslist 
sent a cease and desist notice and implemented an IP block.15 3Taps used a proxy server to 
circumvent the IP block and continued to gather apartment listing data directly from 
Craigslist.16 Craigslist commenced a lawsuit against 3Taps in which the complaint was 
eventually amended to include a CFAA claim and its California state law counterpart.17 In 
denying 3Taps’ motion to dismiss the CFAA claim, the court extended the CFAA to cover 
public data when such data is behind an IP block and combined with a cease and desist 
notice.18 On the surface, this decision seems well-reasoned – Craigslist asked 3Taps to stop 
using Craigslist data and 3Taps not only refused but used computer technology to 
 
9 See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206-07 (4th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 
579 (1st Cir. 2001). 
10 See United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271-73 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 
1258 (11th Cir. 2010); Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 





16 Id. at 967. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 969, n.8. 
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circumvent the IP block.19 However, when applied to modern web browsing contexts, the 
decision loses its logical footing. 
II. WEB SCRAPING 
¶8  To understand modern web browsing, one must first understand how web scraping 
fits in. Before the concept of web scraping, there was web crawling. Web crawling enables 
the copying and transposing of massive data sets into machine-readable and analyzable 
formats.20 The process of web crawling shares many similarities with web scraping. For 
instance, like web crawling, web scraping involves programmatic browsing of web pages 
and targeted data collection.21 Moreover, both methods collect data through end-user 
accessible network ports.22 Unlike web crawling, however, web scraping does not obtain 
permission from each website. Instead, web scraping employs additional technologies to 
mimic human browsing and delve deeper into each website.23  
¶9  Both technologies are methods to grab large sums of data, fast and without human 
interaction. Indeed, certain web scraping technologies like the browser add-on that enables 
users to find free Pacer24 resources represent a bright spot in web scraping and its potential 
to advance the progress of science and the useful arts.25 Conversely, exploitative forms 
such as device or user impersonation designed to obtain private (often confidential) data 
are less than inspiring, but nevertheless are generally limited in application to the gathering 
of private or confidential data.26  
¶10  Modern web browsing involves both web scraping and web crawling. Accordingly, 
in a cybersecurity or trade secret protection context, it is critical to define the scope of 
accessible data with reference to both. That is, it would be ineffective data protection to 
restrict crawling but not scraping. For instance, the USPTO website restricts crawling of 
patents and trademarks by including a disallow instruction to crawlers in its public 
directory in a file labeled “robots.txt” and restricts scraping by using a form that requires 
human interaction before accessing data, also known as a CAPTHCA form.27 To 
 
19 Id. at 967. 
20 See Sys. and Method for Providing Dynamic User Info. in an Interactive Display, U.S. Patent No. 
7,343,567 (filed Apr. 25, 2003) (issued Mar. 11, 2008); Andrew Hogue & David Karger, Thresher: 
Automating the Unwrapping of Semantic Content from the World Wide Web, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD WIDE WEB. ACM (2005), available at 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1060762. 
21Seyed M. Mirtaheri et al., A Brief History of Web Crawlers, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013 CONFERENCE 




23 Bjorn Hartmann, Scott Doorley & Scott R. Klemmer, Hacking, Mashing, Gluing: Understanding 
Opportunistic Design, 7.3 Pervasive Computing IEEE, 46, 46-54 (2008), available at 
http://bjoern.org/papers/hartmann-pervasive2008.pdf; (notably, web scraping employs methodologies such 
as executing Javascript, submitting forms, impersonating a browser, and ignoring robots exclusionary 
headers).  
24 RECAP the Law, About, https://www.recapthelaw.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2014). 
25 Making the writing of law review articles, for example, faster and less expensive. 
26 See Bjorn Hartmann et al., Hacking, Mashing, Gluing: Understanding Opportunistic Design, 7.3 
Pervasive Computing IEEE, 46, 47-48 (2008), available at http://bjoern.org/papers/hartmann-
pervasive2008.pdf. 
27 See USPTO.gov website, Public Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) gateway at 
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summarize, effectively restricting access to data in the modern web browsing context 
necessarily involves attention to web scraping. 
III. UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS AND MERE TOKEN ACCESS CONTROLS 
¶11  The first vulnerability of the CFAA as highlighted in the 3Taps decision concerns 
access controls. This Section explores the notable absence of a definition for the term 
access controls and how that absence is handled among the circuits, which is often by 
analogy to other legal doctrines such as the law of trespass. This section then explores how 
courts ignore web technology when applying the CFAA. Instead, many courts opt to 
evaluate the mental state of the defendant or consider the issue of access control in a 
vacuum and without regard to industry standards, leading to an ever-expanding scope of 
hacking that includes innocuous and useful web technologies.28 More specifically, this 
approach expands the definition of access controls to encompass mere token controls, 
which in the context of an anti-hacking statute operate instead as use controls. By 
encompassing use controls in its interpretation of the CFAA, the 3Taps court inadvertently 
increased potential for many of us to be categorized as hackers.  
A. Policy-based Access Controls 
¶12  The first element of subsection 1030(a)(2)(C), unauthorized access, is not clearly 
defined in the statute.29 Instead, the CFAA focuses on authorization in terms of permission 
and the scope thereof. Not surprisingly, some courts tend to interpret this element in terms 
of trespass doctrines.30 Accordingly, courts often apply policy-based safeguards, such as 
terms of use, computer use restrictions, and even an employee’s general duty of loyalty, to 
trigger liability under the CFAA.31 Notably, the Seventh, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits still 
follow this broad interpretation.32 The policy-based safeguard approach completely ignores 
the technology underlying access controls and instead shifts the focus onto the mental states 
of the plaintiff and defendant. In Brekka, the Ninth Circuit held that an employee’s 
violation of her duty of loyalty is not an appropriate proxy for triggering liability under the 
CFAA.33 The court reasoned that this interpretation inappropriately ignored the nature of 
access.34 Because the CFAA is all about computer hacking, the nature of the access, 
particularly in the context of modern technology, should play an important role. How better 
to define the scope of authorization than to explore the context in which the data was 
protected? Otherwise, the court fails to completely measure the scope of authorization, and 
risks unjustifiably expanding the scope of the CFAA.  
 
http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair. 
28 See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012). 
29 Subsection 1030(e)(6) defines what it means to “exceed access,” but nowhere in the statute is the term 
“access” defined. 
30 eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
31 Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006); 
32 See United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271-73 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 
1258 (11th Cir. 2010); Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
33 LVRC HOLDINGS LCC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). 
34 A violator’s state of mind is already well accounted for in the CFAA. 
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B. Narrowing the Scope under Nosal 
¶13  In Nosal, the Ninth Circuit further narrowed the scope of unauthorized access to 
better incorporate evaluating how the data was protected by holding that unauthorized 
access (a) applies only to the circumvention of technological safeguards and (b) does not 
apply in the context of use controls.35 Here, “use controls” means the exercise of control 
over use of the data after such data has already been accessed and collected, which is 
chiefly handled by trade secret and misappropriation law doctrines.36 The Court reasoned 
that narrowing application of the CFAA to circumvention of technological barriers better 
captures the Statute’s anti-hacking intent and cited its decision in Brekka for support.37 The 
Fourth Circuit adopted a similar stance in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 
which mirrors the court’s reasoning in Nosal.38 Moreover, the court used the online dating 
scene to illustrate the untenable impact of importing use controls for CFAA liability: many 
people would be in violation of the CFAA with outdated online profiles that do not adhere 
to the most recent terms of use policies on the sites.39 Nevertheless, and perhaps more 
impactful than the relief provided to online singles everywhere, the court held that the 
CFAA was not intended to apply as a misappropriation tool.40 Notably, the court failed to 
provide any test or guidelines for when a technological safeguard or access control would 
meet the standard under Nosal.  
¶14  Taking advantage of what the court in Nosal left unclear, the defendant in 3Taps used 
a proxy server in circumvention of an internet protocol address block (IP block) initiated 
on otherwise publicly-accessible data.41 The 3Taps court construed the Nosal decision to 
apply to any technological safeguard or access controls, regardless of whether such were 
mere tokens of protection.42 Grouping mere token safeguards with functional safeguards 
exposes a “hack" in the framework of the statute and the holding in Nosal. Nosal stands for 
the proposition that use controls are beyond the scope of the CFAA.43 Further, in order to 
be defined as an access control it follows that the control would need to provide some 
access-restricting function.44 Otherwise, a danger arises that a plaintiff need only initiate 
patchwork, token access controls to disguise a use control on public data.45   
¶15  In support of this potential danger, relevant authority reveals that the lower the 
sophistication of the safeguard involved, the higher the tendency there is for using the 
CFAA as a misappropriation tool.46 For example, in holding that the defendant’s violations 
 
35 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012). 
36 See Id. at 863; Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 40, cmt. a (2009).  
37 Id. at 865. 
38 Andrew F. Popper, More than the Sum of All Parts: Taking on IP and IT Theft Through a Global 
Partnership, 12 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 253 (2014), available at  
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol12/iss4/1 (citing WEC Carolina Energy 
Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206-07 (4th Cir. 2012).  
39 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 865. 
40 Id. at 863. 
41 See Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
42 Id. 
43 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863-64. 
44 Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 933 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
45 See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857. 
46 Id. at 862 (“We remain unpersuaded by the decisions of our sister circuits that interpret the CFAA 
broadly to cover violations of corporate computer use restrictions or violations of a duty of loyalty . . . . 
These courts looked only at the culpable behavior of the defendants before them, and failed to consider the 
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of terms of use cannot be defined as hacking under the CFAA, the court in Cvent reasoned 
that the plaintiff’s data was “not protected in any meaningful fashion by its Terms of Use 
or otherwise.”47  In other words, and similar to the rationale behind the doctrine of trade 
secret law, a plaintiff cannot cry foul over the use of data that it fails to effectively protect.48  
¶16  Nevertheless, the 3Taps court took a page from the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
Citrin and found solace in the fact that the defendant had clear notice that its access was 
unwanted (a policy-based safeguard approach).49 Similar to the homeowner who uses an 
ADT sticker to safeguard herself from home invasion, the court shifted its focus from 
functional web security to notice; a shift that does not square with the Statute’s access-
centered, anti-hacking intent.50 Notably, had the defendant decided to read Craigslist 
advertisements in Spanish, it would have been engaged in hacking under this logic, because 
translation websites often use a proxy server.51  
IV. PUBLIC V. PRIVATE DATA UNDER THE CFAA 
¶17  Tied closely to the definition of access controls is the nature of the data behind them. 
For instance, should data behind a mere token access control such as entering in your age 
or state of residency really be considered private or protected? Section IV analyzes the 
precedential deviation made the 3Taps Court by applying the CFAA to publicly-accessible 
data, and argues that the emphasis on meaningful and technological safeguards set out in 
Nosal and Cvent imply that only private and protected data was intended to be covered by 
the CFAA. This section also examines the case law distinguishing private and public data 
in the context of the CFAA, and suggest a third, intermediary category of “protected data.”  
A. An Unjustified Leap 
¶18  Perhaps the most critical step in the 3Taps court’s reasoning was “[a]ssuming that 
the CFAA encompasses information generally available to the public.”52 Taken by itself, 
this is a logical step necessary to the conclusion drawn by the court. By accepting that an 
IP block was a covered access control under the CFAA, the court had little option but to 
open the CFAA to public data.53 To be sure, while the access control and public data 
questions were bifurcated in 3Taps, these issues remain inextricably linked, particularly in 
the context of the Internet. Data on the internet behind token access controls might as well 
be publicly-available – just ask Sony Pictures.54 The bifurcation of these questions and the 
assumption that the CFAA applies to public data has widespread import. For example, the 
 
effect on millions of ordinary citizens caused by the statute's unitary definition of ‘exceeds authorized 
access.’”). 
47 Cvent, 739 F. Supp. 2d at 933 (emphasis added). 
48 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39, cmt. a (2009). 
49 Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013); see also Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC 
v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
50 See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857. 
51 The use of Google Translate software masks the originating IP address similar to using a proxy server.  
52 3Taps, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 969. 
53 Id. at 983, n.8. 
54 Mike Masnick, Sony Goes One Ridiculous Step Further: Threatens To Sue Twitter Over Leaked 
Email Screenshots (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141222/16125129508/sony-goes-
one-ridiculous-step-further-threatens-to-sue-twitter-over-leaked-email-screenshots.shtml. 
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CFAA does not define the meaning of “information.”55 Congressional history indicates 
that the CFAA was designed to protect the privacy of data.56 In amending the CFAA to 
include subsection 1030(a)(2)(C), drafters stated that “[t]he proposed subsection 
1030(a)(2)(C) is intended to protect against the interstate or foreign theft of information by 
computer.”57 Moreover drafters stated the entire “premise of this subsection is privacy 
protection” and that unauthorized access under this subsection “includes mere observation 
of the data.”58 These three elements - theft, privacy, and mere observation – cut against the 
assumption that subsection 1030(a)(2)(C) applies to public data. To be sure, how can one 
steal public information? 
B. An Emphasis on Private Data 
¶19  The dichotomy between the Act’s treatment of public and private data becomes even 
more pronounced in judicial application. In Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc the 
defendant Power Ventures developed scraping software whereby users input their 
Facebook login credentials to “invite their friends” to join the Power Ventures’ service 
offering.59 The software accessed the user’s Facebook account and email contact list, 
thereafter sending invite emails to the private contact list without recipient permission.60 
In siding with Facebook’s position, the court pointed to the password-protected 
information, individual to each user, and the technique of user impersonation as a 
disingenuous exploitation of network trust.61  
¶20  Importantly, scraping of private data can generally be distinguished from scraping of 
public data in that the former involves circumvention of individualized login or some other 
type of obfuscation applied against all users.62 For instance, in EF Cultural Travel v. 
Explorica, Inc., the First Circuit held that the use of a web scraper in combination with 
information not readily accessible to users amounts to unauthorized access under the 
CFAA.63 Here, the defendant used the services of a current employee to translate tour codes 
for use in the web scraping software.64 The software would then access the website and 
submit tour codes and harvest related pricing data.65 In isolation, the tour codes were 
meaningless. However, when combined with the knowledge of how EF Cultural Travel’s 
website used the tour codes in connection with querying a backend database for current 
pricing, use of the tour codes became more exploitative in nature.66  
 
55 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
56 S. Rep. No. 104-347, at 3 (1996) (“[This] Leahy-Kyl-Grassley amendment to the National 
Information Infrastructure (NII) Protection Act, S. 982, would strengthen the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030 by closing gaps in the law to protect better the confidentiality, integrity, and security 
of computer data and networks.”). 
57 Id. at 6. 
58 Id.  
59 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc. (Facebook II), 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
60 Id. 
61 See id. at 1028. 




66 Id. at 582-83 
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¶21  Notably, the 3Taps court did not cite any precedent that applies the CFAA to public 
data.67 Indeed, there are very few judicial applications to public data in the context of the 
CFAA. In Register.com v. Verio, the defendant developed a scraping software to harvest 
publicly-accessible WHOIS domain registrant email addresses.68 Verio emailed registrants 
for the purposes of offering a competitive website development service.69 Register was an 
ICANN registrar and operated the public database pursuant to an agreement with ICANN 
and its own terms of use.70 The court focused on Verio’s violation of Register’s terms of 
use in the context of contract law, and declined to weigh in on the applicability of CFAA.71 
However, the dissenting opinion makes clear that establishing damages in this context is 
improbable.72  Moreover, terms of use that purport to restrict the use of public data, but 
which do not require a private, individualized step to limit access are unenforceable in 
many jurisdictions and raise concerns equivalent to those encountered in Feist regarding 
protection of factual information.73  For instance, in Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, 
Inc., a California federal district court examined the potential misappropriation claims of 
public data in the context of preemption under the Copyright Act.74 Although not applying 
the CFAA, the court emphasized the danger for protecting factual, public data under para-
copyright claims in circumvention of the Copyright Act and the longstanding principles in 
Feist.75  
C. Protected Data 
¶22  If anything, the dearth of CFAA application to protect publicly-accessible data 
indicates its inappropriateness under an anti-hacking statute. Notably, Senator Leahy 
recently proposed an amendment to limit the information protected under the CFAA to 
seven categories of protected information, such as passwords or personally-identifiable 
information.76 By limiting applicability to protected data, Senator Leahy’s bill shifts the 
focus back onto the access controls used to safeguard the data. More importantly, this third 
category of “protected data” not only synthesizes the current dichotomy between public 
and private data, but ensures CFAA coverage of public data which is destroyed or defaced 
through intrusion to a backend, protected system.  
 
67 3Taps, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 970 (citing Weingand v. Harland Financial Solutions, No. C-11-3109, 2012 
WL 2327660 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2012) and Facebook II).  
68 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 395-96 (2d Cir. 2004). 
69 Id. at 395. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 401-02. 
72 Id. at 440 (Parker, J., dissenting) (“To maintain a cause of action under the CFAA against Verio, 
Register.com must demonstrate the Verio violated the CFAA in a manner that has caused Register.com 
damages or losses of at least $5,000. There is nothing in the record to suggest that this has occurred.”). 
73 See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000), 
aff’d 248 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2001); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
74 Id.  
75 Feist, 499 U.S. at 363. 
76 S. 1897, 113th Cong. §§ 104, 107 (2014) (“Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014”).  
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V. LOSS DECLARATIONS: THREE IMPORTANT FACTORS 
¶23  The second vulnerability of the CFAA as highlighted in the 3Taps decision concerns 
loss declarations. This section examines the evolution of the loss requirement under the 
CFAA and how cursory review of loss declarations has swallowed the meaning of the once 
important statutory requirement. Now, loss declarations serve as more of a procedural 
“check box” where plaintiffs need only retain a forensic IT consultant to tell them what 
they already know.77  
¶24  In order to maintain a civil action against a defendant under the CFAA, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate a loss to one or more persons during any one-year period aggregating at 
least $5,000 in value.78 A “loss” is defined as any reasonable cost to any victim, including 
the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the 
data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue 
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of 
service.79 Prior to this definition being added to the statute in the USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001, courts had difficulty analyzing claims of loss as made by business entities.80 
Eventually, the Ninth Circuit solved the problem by defining “loss” in terms of system-
related harm, such as service interruption or requiring users to change passwords.81  For 
example, courts have held that the mere copying of proprietary data is insufficient to 
establish a loss under the CFAA.82  Instead, a plaintiff must show that there was an 
impairment to its computer system or data as a result of the intrusion.83 Moreover, a 
plaintiff must connect the loss to the actual intrusion.84 Notably, this language tracks 
closely with most cyber liability insurance policy language.85  
A. Three Categories of Losses 
¶25  Congress also intended that the loss be reasonably or necessarily incurred by the 
plaintiff.86 Jury instructions often mirror this requirement.87 In the context of web scraping 
and before 3Taps, there were three types of losses recognized by relevant case law.  
 
77 See, e.g., Multiven, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 887, 895 (2010) (“Costs associated with 
investigating intrusions into a computer network and taking subsequent remedial measures are losses within 
the meaning of the statute . . . .”); Kimberlite Corp. v. John Does 1–20, No. C08-2147, 2008 WL 2264485 
(N.D. Cal. June 2, 2008). 
78 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).  
79 Id. at 1030(e)(11). 
80 See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 814(d)(5) (“USA Patriot Act of 2001”). 
81 United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000).  
82 See Andritz, Inc. v. S. Maint. Contractor, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1266-67 (M.D. Ga. 2009).  
83 Id. 
84 See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126 (W.D. 
Wash. 2000). 
85 See Insuring Innovation. CyberFirst® Coverage for Technology Companies, The Travelers Indemnity 
Company, p. 10 (2012), available at https://www.travelers.com/business-insurance/specialized-
industries/technology/docs/CyberFirst-Suite-locked.pdf. 
86 S. Rep. No. 104-357, pt. IV(1)(E). 
87 Middleton, 231 F.3d at 1213 (“In determining the amount of losses, you may consider what measures 
were reasonably necessary to restore the data, program, system, or information that you find was damaged 
or what measures were reasonably necessary to resecure the data, program, system, or information from 
further damage.”).  
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¶26  The first is with respect to spamming and looming violations of applicable laws, 
regulations, or orders. For example, the court in Facebook II focused on the potential 
violations of the CAN-SPAM Act to substantiate the plaintiff’s argument that it had 
properly established the loss requirement under the subsection 1030(e)(11).88 At issue in 
Facebook II was the defendant’s software that requested user credentials, and then 
impersonated a user and emailed the user’s Facebook contact lists with unauthorized 
communications.89  In this regard, the looming threat of a CAN-SPAM Act (or its 
international anti-spam counterpart) lawsuit justifies Facebook incurring expenses in 
connection with a forensic IT investigation. Moreover, it is likely a covered first-party loss 
under most incarnations of a cyber-liability policy.90 In contrast to a loss incurred solely to 
comply with the statutory loss requirement, Facebook’s loss declaration more squarely fits 
within the purpose of the CFAA as an anti-hacking statute. 
¶27  The second type of loss applicable to a web-scraping context is where a password 
portal has been circumvented and private data leaked. In Successfactor, the court agreed 
with the plaintiff’s argument that when a password protected environment is bypassed, 
certain costly security measures need to be undertaken to ensure network and application 
integrity.91  Moreover, in Vanderhye v. iParadigms, the Fourth Circuit held that 
investigation into the possibility of a technical glitch in the system qualified as a loss under 
the CFAA, because such glitch impacted the way in which the plaintiff secured private 
data.92  Significantly, each of these cases involved a password-protected portal.93  
¶28  The third type of recognized loss in the context of web scraping demonstrates that 
losses related to web access must be reasonably incurred, but specifically in the context of 
trespass to chattels. In the famous case Bidder’s Edge, the plaintiff claimed harm to its 
system based on the potential for unchecked aggregation of access and irreparable harm 
caused thereby.94  In overruling this decision, the court in Intel v. Hamidi held that the 
potential for harm is not sufficient proof of harm.95  The Fifth Circuit followed suit, stating 
that web scraping of a publicly-available website, without more, is insufficient to fulfill the 
harm requirement (in the context of trespass to chattels).96   
B. A New Category 
¶29  The 3Taps Court made no effort to categorize the loss incurred by Craigslist within 
relevant case law.97 Craigslist’s loss declaration cites an internal investigation into the harm 
caused by the defendant’s intrusion, well in excess of the $5,000 threshold.98 The court’s 
 
88 See, e.g., Facebook II, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1028; Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 
(E.D. Va. 1998).  
89 Facebook II, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1028. 
90 See Rawlings, Philip. "Cyber Risk: Insuring the Digital Age." Queen Mary School of Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper 189, p. 21 (2015). 
91 SuccessFactors, Inc. v. Softscape Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 975 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (internal citations 
omitted). 
92 AV ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 645 (4th Cir. 2009). 
93 Id. at 634; SuccessFactors, 544 F.Supp. 2d at 975. 
94 eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
95 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) 
96 White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex., 420 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2005).  
97 See generally 3Taps, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 968. 
98 First Amended Complaint at 35, Craigslist v. 3Taps INC., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 
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primary interest centered on whether defendant had access the information without 
authorization, without more than a cursory glance at the nature of the loss involved.99 
Notably, California Penal Code section 502 does not require a similar showing of loss.100 
Regardless, the loss requirement under the CFAA is anything but a meaningless 
requirement.  
¶30  What is interesting about the 3Taps decision is that the court dealt with the CFAA 
application to public data with nothing more than literal application of the statute; whereas, 
the decisions discussed previously devote considerably more attention to the nature of the 
data and the loss incurred in maintaining data security.101 By applying the statute literally, 
courts streamline application of the CFAA, which may have benefits in circumstances 
where the loss is intangible or reputational in nature. To be sure, conducting a forensic 
investigation to confirm that no other data was leaked has value in and of itself, even if the 
investigation merely confirms what the plaintiff already knew. Nevertheless, it bears 
mentioning that outside of 3Taps, the case history on the harm caused by a proxy server is 
nonexistent. A proxy server does not change the nature of access (or scope thereof), but 
instead changes the identity of the person accessing (similar to lying about your date of 
birth to circumvent a self-attested age restriction), which is a critical distinction in the 
context of public data.102 In this regard, the circumvention of access controls that by default 
deny all traffic versus those that by default admit all traffic can be distinguished to better 
analyze a loss declaration. Indeed, releasing data to the public has certain inherent risks, 
risks that are not affected by the identity of the person accessing. That Craigslist needed to 
investigate the use of a proxy server seems disingenuous at best.103 At worst, such 
investigations represent the perfunctory circumvention of a meaningful statutory 
requirement. Notably, Craigslist did not require passwords or the CAPTCHA tool used by 
many U.S. government websites to prevent robotic access to public data.104  
¶31  A cursory application of the loss requirement leads to the potential for punishing 
innocuous behavior. For instance, had the Defendant translated a Craigslist advertisement 
in Spanish, it would have caused the same harm to Craigslist computers. To avoid this 
result, courts can add meaning to the loss requirement by: (1) analyzing the nature of the 
data and its value to the plaintiff; (2) distinguishing between access controls which by 
default deny all traffic and those that by default admit all traffic; and (3) analyzing the 
reasonableness of incurring expenses under the circumstances. By adding meaning to the 
loss requirement, courts not only avoid punishing innocuous activity, but incent proper web 
security. 
 
CV 12-03816 CRB). 
99 See generally 3Taps, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (The court states, “[t]he parties agree that the 
requirements of both statutes are functionally identical.” This is incorrect. See Cal. Penal § 502, infra note 
100).  
100 Cal. Penal Code § 502(e)(1) (Any damage or loss is recognized under the Statute). 
101 Cf. Facebook II, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1039. 
102 See Cui, Lawrence, Method and Apparatus for Proxy Server Cookies, US Patent No. 6,910,180 
(2000) (“Not only does the invention solve the problems of browsers that cannot handle cookies, the 
invention also protects the privacy of surfers by hiding their identities.”). 
103 First Amended Complaint at 35, Craigslist v. 3Taps INC., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 
CV 12-03816 CRB). 
104 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Public PAIR, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
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VI. CHALLENGES AND PROPOSAL 
*** 
¶32  When does working smarter cross the line into cheating? Answering that question 
largely involves a normative analysis, which can only be done in context. For example, we 
can all agree that using your mobile device to win at trivia night is likely cheating. On the 
other hand, the outcome seems different when connecting to Wi-Fi in court to win your 
trial.  
¶33  The purpose of this article was to identify two vulnerabilities in the CFAA as it 
applies in the modern web-browsing context, namely as against web scraping. More 
broadly, however, this article isolates a problem inherent in applying an anti-hacking 
statute in a vacuum and in a purely literal sense. For example, access controls that poorly 
control access are viewed in the same light as those that do so effectively.105 
¶34  It bears mentioning that the arguments advanced in this article are not intended to 
require a plaintiff under the CFAA to have effective safeguards or access controls. Indeed, 
the effectiveness of web security is in the eye of the hacker, and not all hackers are created 
equal. Nor does the author intend that the CFAA should not be applied to public data which 
are defaced, destroyed, or damaged by hacking attacks; rather, the CFAA should apply to 
any data behind reasonable access controls. By focusing on the reasonableness of the 
access controls, the CFAA is narrowed to protect certain data types, which prevents the 
type plaintiff abuse identified in this article.  
¶35  Recent legislative proposals aim to solve this problem. Aaron’s Law proposes to 
codify much of the Nosal decision and represents a step in the right direction, but also 
contains a flaw common in the many amendments to the CFAA.106 Applying a hacking 
statute to cover specific scenarios is necessarily backward-looking in the face of dynamic 
technology. In other words, past trends do not indicate future results. Indeed, this flaw is 
evident in the 3Taps decision.107  
¶36  Instead, Senator Leahy’s proposal to identify seven categories of protected 
information represents a forward-looking solution to the vulnerabilities in the CFAA.108 
By defining the CFAA in terms of the data it seeks to protect, not only does this proposal 
avoid the CFAA being used as a misappropriation tool, but it prevents the CFAA from 
being applied to punish innocuous activity, which in some cases represents advancement 
of the sciences and useful arts. 
¶37  In the interim, this article proposes that courts first limit application of the CFAA to 
“protected data.” “Protected data” in this context means data behind access controls that 
are reasonable under the circumstances and in accordance with good web security 
practices. By combining the data type analysis (public v. private) with the access control 
analysis, this proposal better synthesizes relevant case law as well as statutory intent. 
Bifurcation of this analysis tends to confuse the issue and opens the analysis to include 
mere token access controls, as demonstrated in the 3Taps decision.109 
 
105 See 3Taps, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 983, n.6. 
106 H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013) (“Aaron’s Law Act of 2013”).  
107 See 3Taps, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 983, n.6. 
108 S. 1897, 113th Cong. §§ 104, 107 (2014) (“Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014”). 
109 See 3Taps, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 983, n.8. 
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¶38  In addition to limiting applicability to protected data, this article proposes that loss 
declarations should be reviewed using the follow three-factor test: (1) nature of the data 
and value to plaintiff; (2) type of access control and default scope of authorization; and (3) 
reasonableness of losses incurred. By evaluating under these three factors, courts 
effectively add meaning back to an important statutory element and place themselves back 
in the equation to better curtail plaintiff abuse.  
¶39  Common in the web software industry is the use of application programming 
interfaces or APIs to connect to distinct software platforms.110 Best industry practices 
dictate that APIs should be developed in a dynamic and evolvable fashion to prevent simple 
changes from devastating the overall purpose of the software.111 In this regard, the CFAA 
acts as an API to the normative definition of computer hacking, and can be redesigned to 
be dynamic and evolvable simply by incorporating industry context. 
  
 
110 Dig, Danny, and Ralph Johnson. "The Role of Refactorings in API Evolution." Software 
Maintenance, 2005. ICSM'05. Proceedings of the 21st IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2005. 
111 Id. 
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